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TELEPHONIC APPROVAL OF SEARCH WARRANT NOT VIOLATIVE OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT
United States v. Turner
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution,' sup-
plemented by rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2
prescribes the standards against which the validity of federal search
warrants are tested.' Procedures established by the individual
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
I Prior to the amendment of October 1, 1977, FED. R. CRMi. P. 41(c) provided in pertinent
part:
(c)Issuance and Contents. A warrant shall issue only on an affidavit or affidavits
sworn to before the federal magistrate or state judge and establishing the grounds
for issuing the warrant. If the federal magistrate or state judge is satisfied that
grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they
exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the property and naming or describing
the person or place to be searched. . . . Before ruling on a request for a warrant
the federal magistrate or state judge may require the affiant to appear personally
and may examine under oath the affiant and any witnesses he may produce ....
Rule 41(c) further provides for recordation of the proceeding, execution of the warrant
within a 10 day period to avoid staleness, and the need for further authorization before a
search warrant can be executed other than during the daytime hours. Id.
3 The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the requirement that a disinterested mag-
istrate must find probable cause prior to the issuance of a warrant. See Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1975); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1972). The
purpose of this rule has been to insure that the determination of probable cause is not made
by someone involved in the investigation and therefore predisposed to a finding of probable
cause. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)); accord, United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464
(1932). See generally LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in
Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. Rxv. 987 (1965).
The requirement of judicial evaluation prior to the issuance of a search warrant serves
to interpose a magistrate between the citizen and the police. The Supreme Court, in McDon-
ald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), stated the rationale to this constitutionally man-
dated evaluation:
It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy
in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust
to the discretion of [the police] . . . . And so the Constitution requires a magis-
trate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home.
Id. at 455-56.
The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause for the pur-
poses of issuing a warrant lies somewhere between reasonable suspicion and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. While "evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary, common
rumor or report, suspicion, or even 'strong reason to suspect'" will not be sufficient. Henry
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). See also Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
339 (1813). In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the Supreme Court categorized
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states, however, frequently subject local warrants to more exacting
scrutiny than that mandated by the Constitution.4 Consequently,
where federal and state officers jointly participate in the application
for or execution of a state-issued warrant, and seized evidence is
sought to be admitted in a federal prosecution, uncertainty arises
concerning which jurisdiction's rule of law is to be applied in evalu-
ating a motion to suppress that evidence.5
Recently, in United States v. Turner,I the Second Circuit con-
fronted this problem and held that federal participation in a state-
initiated search of the defendant's residence rendered the search
federal in nature, thus subjecting the evidence seized to federal
standards of admissibility.7 In addition, the court held that a search
warrant, authorized over the telephone by a state magistrate as
permitted by state law, satisfies the fourth amendment require-
ments that a warrant be "issued by a neutral and detached magis-
trate" and "supported by Oath or affirmation."'
William Turner was arrested by California state authorities for
allegedly violating a state law prohibiting the distribution of lae-
trile.5 While Turner was in custody, state and federal authorities,
desiring to search his residence, sought authorization to do so under
the standard of probable cause as requiring "only the probability, and not a prima facie
showing, of criminal activity." Id. at 419. See also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
See generally Note, Probable Cause to Seize and the Fourth Amendment: An Analysis, 34
ALB. L.REv. 658 (1970); Note, Spinelli v. United States: Searching for Probable Cause, 30
U. Prrr. L. REv. 735 (1969).
1 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1528 (Deering 1970) and N.Y. CrIM. PRoc. LAw § 690.25
(McKinney 1971) with FED. R. CmiM. P. 41(c); see Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 59, 62 (1967).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Sellers,
483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); Navarro v. United States, 400
F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1968).
558 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g No. 74-124 (D. Conn., Oct. 5, 1976).
558 F.2d at 49.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 48. CAL. HEALTH & SAFEry CODE § 1707.1 (Deering 1975) provides in pertinent
part:
The sale, offering for sale, holding for sale, delivering, giving away, prescribing
or administering of any drug, medicine, compound or device to be used in the
diagnosis, treatment, alleviation or cure of cancer is unlawful and prohibited unless
(1) an application with respect thereto has been approved under Section 505 of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Believed by some to aid in the treatment of cancer, laetrile. has not been approved by the
Federal Food and Drug Administration, and its distribution in California is therefore prohib-
ited under § 1707.1. The substance is legally manufactured and distributed abroad, particu-
larly in West Germany and Mexico. Its status in the United States, however, has been highly
questionable. See, e.g., Holden, Battle to Legitimize Laetrile Continues Unabated, SCIENCE,
May 20, 1977, at 854.
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a California statute which permits the use of oral warrants.10 The
officers telephoned a local magistrate who administered an oath and
heard their testimony." Concluding that there existed sufficient
probable cause to support the search, the magistrate directed the
federal agent to fill in a blank warrant form and sign the judge's
name.'" A search of Turner's premises was subsequently conducted,
resulting in the seizure of a number of items which the federal
government sought to use as evidence against Turner in a federal
drug prosecution.' 3 The district court found that the procedure em-
ployed in obtaining the warrant was violative of the California law
in that the warrant was not signed by a "peace officer" within the
meaning of the statute.'4 The court concluded that since California
courts would suppress the seized evidence in the instant situation,
such evidence was not admissible at Turner's trial. 5
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court.
Judge Meskill, writing for a unanimous panel, 6 initially sought to
determine which standard-state or federal-was to be applied in
deciding Turner's motion to suppress. 7 Noting that federal agents
10 558 F.2d at 48-49. Authorization for the warrant was sought pursuant to CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1526(b), 1528(b) (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1978). Although the statutes are not limited
to telephone authorizations, a large number of warrants issued under the statute have utilized
the telephone. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE 95 (1973); Miller, Telephonic Search Warrants: The San Diego
Experience, 9 THE PROSECUTOR 385 (1974).
The California Penal Code provides for oral judicial examination of the warrant appli-
cant with mandatory recordation and transcription of the oral statement. The recording and
transcribed statement are then filed with the clerk of the court so that the defendant may
have access to the records for the purposes of questioning the magistrate's finding of probable
cause. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526(b) (Deering Supp. 1978). Upon a finding of probable
cause, the statute permits the magistrate to issue a search warrant by authorizing a peace
officer to sign the magistrate's name on the duplicate original warrant. The duplicate war-
rants are each signed with the magistrate's name: the original by the magistrate himself, and
the duplicate original warrant by the peace officer with the magistrate's oral authorization.
In addition, the warrants are carefully dated and the exact time is noted so as to account for
discrepancies between time of issuance and time of execution. Id. § 1528(b) (Deering 1971).
,i 558 F.2d at 48. A conference phone was set up among the magistrate, two state
officials and a special agent of the U.S. Customs Service. Id.
12 Id.
,1 The search was conducted by state and local authorities as well as federal customs
agents. Id. A total of 79 separate groups of items were seized, including invoices and letters
directly relating to the charges against Turner. Brief for Appellant at 8.
" 558 F.2d at 49. The California statute authorizes a "peace officer" to sign the oral
warrant. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1528(b) (Deering 1971). Under California law a federal customs
agent is not considered a peace officer. Id. §§ 830.1-.7, .10-.12 (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1978).
," 558 F.2d at 49. The district court found that California courts would suppress although
the defect was only technical in nature. See id.
Joining Judge Meskill in the opinion were Judges Gurfein and Feinberg.
, 558 F.2d at 49. On appeal to the Second Circuit, the government, relying on Sternberg
v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. App. 1974), contested the
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had taken part in the search, and that the prosecution was a federal
one, the court concluded that the propriety of admission of the
evidence was governed by federal law. 8 The Second Circuit then
turned to the defendant's contention that the procedures employed
with respect to the warrant were violative of rule 41. The Turner
panel stated that because the amended version of rule 41(c), which
governs oral warrants, was not yet effective,19 it would assume that
violations of the rule occurred and determine whether such viola-
tions necessitated suppression. 0 Pointing to its prior decision in
United States v. Burke,2' the court reasoned that suppression would
be required only if the violations had been intentional or had re-
sulted in prejudice to the defendant. 2 Judge Meskill found no evi-
dence of an intentional violation, and nothing to indicate that the
defendant had suffered the type of prejudice which would lead to
suppression."
Addressing Turner's constitutional arguments, the Second Cir-
cuit described the signing of the warrant by the customs agent on
behalf of the magistrate as the "delegat[ion of a] purely ministerial
task. ' '24 Thus, the court found that telephonic warrants satisfy the
constitutional requirement that warrants be issued by a magistrate
where, as in the instant case, "the magistrate performs the substan-
tive tasks of determining probable cause and authorizing the issu-
district court's finding that the California courts would suppress the evidence. Brief for
Appellant at 12. In Sternberg, the court refused to exclude evidence obtained under a warrant
that was not signed until after the search. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 291-92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
Turner, on the other hand, argued that California courts require warrant procedures to
comply strictly with the statute. In support, he cited Bowyer v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App.
3d 151, 111 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Ct. App. 1974), where the court suppressed the fruits of a search
conducted pursuant to a telephonic warrant which the officers neglected to produce until the
day following the search. Brief for Appellee at 48.
11 558 F.2d at 49 (citing Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), discussed in notes
31, 36 and accompanying text infra).
" The amendments became effective on October 1, 1977. PUB. L. No. 95-78, § 4(b), 91
Stat. 322 (1977).
558 F.2d at 52.
21 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1975).
2 Id. at 386-87. Burke established a two-tiered approach for determining the validity of
warrant procedures. Under the Burke test, if a search is determined to have conformed to
constitutional requirements but was violative of rule 41, suppression will result only if: "(1)
there was 'prejudice' in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have
been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and
deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule." Id. (footnote omitted). For a complete
discussion of Burke, see Note, Technical Defects in Federal Search Warrants, 50 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 347 (1975).
z 558 F.2d at 52-53.
24 Id. at 50.
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ance of the warrant .. "..25 Dismissing the contention that a tele-
phonic search warrant cannot be said to have been "supported by
Oath or affirmation" within the meaning of the Constitution, the
Turner panel concluded that the fourth amendment is "sufficiently
flexible to account for such technological advances""6 and held tele-
phonic oaths constitutionally valid."
In concluding that federal law governed the admissibility of the
seized evidence,2 8 the Second Circuit applied the long-standing test
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lustig v. United States"' and
Byars v. United States."' In Lustig, the Court subjected evidence
uncovered in a joint federal-state search to federal exclusion stan-
dards because federal officers "had a hand in" the search.3 ' Literally
2 Id.
25 Id.; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (wiretapping); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 50-53 (1967) (wiretapping); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-
79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (wiretapping); Lopez v. United States, 370 F.2d 8 (5th
Cir. 1966) (information relayed via police radio). 558 F.2d at 50.
558 F.2d at 50. The issue whether telephonic oaths are valid has met with a diver-
gence of opinion at the state level. Under common law and in most American jurisdictions,
telephonic oaths have been held invalid. E.g., Southern State Bank v. Sumner, 187 N.C. 762,
122 S.E. 848 (1924); Roach v. Francisco, 138 Tenn. 357, 197 S.W. 1099 (1917). Some jurisdic-
tions, however, do recognize the validity of telephonic oaths. State v. Boniface, 26 Ariz. App.
118, 546 P.2d 843 (1976) (statutorily); McKnight v. State Land Bd., 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P.2d
726 (1963); Kuhn v. St. Joseph, 234 S.W. 353 (Mo. App. 1921). California has sanctioned the
use of telephonic oaths through the legislature, see note 10 supra, as well as the courts. People
v. Peck, 38 Cal. App. 3d 993, 113 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1974); People v. Aguirre, 26 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1972). See also Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches and
Seizures: The Michigan Proposals, 73 MICH. L. REv. 221, 258-63 (1974); Nakell, Proposed
Revisions of North Carolina's Search and Seizure Law, 52 N.C. L. REV. 277, 306-11 (1973);
Comment, Oral Search Warrants: A New Standard of Warrant Availability, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 691 (1973).
2 See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
338 U.S. 74 (1949).
273 U.S. 28 (1927). In Byars, a search warrant was issued by a state municipal court
judge directing "any peace officer" of Des Moines, Iowa to search defendant's residence for
liquor and materials used to manufacture liquor. Id. at 29. After the warrant was issued, a
local officer requested a federal agent to accompany him on the search. The joint search
resulted in the seizure of liquor stamps ultimately used as evidence in a federal prosecution.
Id. at 30-31. In reversing defendant's conviction, the Court categorized the search as federal,
and thus subject to the proscriptions of the fourth amendment. Id. at 33. In so deciding, the
Byars Court emphasized that the federal agent had participated in the search, not as a private
person, but in his capacity as a federal agent. Thus, the Court concluded:
We cannot avoid the conclusion that the participation of the agent was under color
of his federal stance and that the search in substance and effect was a joint opera-
tion of the local and federal officers. In that view, so far as this inquiry is concerned,
the effect is the same as though he had engaged in the undertaking as one exclu-
sively on his own.
Id.
31 338 U.S. at 78. Lustig arose 22 years after Byars and similarly involved a joint search.
In Lustig, a federal Secret Service agent intimated to state officers that he suspected defen-
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applying this language, the Turner court concluded that the search
therein was federal in nature.32 Such an interpretation of this phrase
appears unwarranted, however, in view of the historical background
of the Byars-Lustig rule.
At the time of the Byars and Lustig decisions, the exclusionary
rule, which mandates the suppression of evidence improperly seized
under the fourth amendment, 3 only benefited victims of illegal fed-
dant of engaging in violations of federal counterfeiting laws. Id. at 76. On the basis of a
violation of an unrelated state law, the state police conducted an illegal search of defendant's
hotel room. Id. Although the federal agent had neither requested the search nor participated
in it, he went to defendant's hotel room subsequent to the search and while there was given
several articles which the search had revealed. Id. at 77-78. The Court found the time at which
the agent had entered the proceedings not to be dispositive. Despite the apparently minimal
involvement of the agent, the Court characterized the search as federal in nature and con-
cluded that the fruits of the search should have been suppressed. Id. at 78-80. In so conclud-
ing, Justice Frankfurter restated the Byars principle as follows:
The crux of [the] doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if
he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by
state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter. The
decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of
a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence
by other than sanctioned means. It is immaterial whether a federal agent originated
the idea or joined in it while the search was in progress. So long as he was in it before
the object of the search was completely accomplished, he must be deemed to have
participated in it.
Id. at 78-79.
558 F.2d at 49.
= The exclusionary rule was first applied in the landmark decision of Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), wherein the Supreme Court required the return of evidence which
had been obtained from the defendant in violation of the fourth amendment. Prior to Weeks,
the emphasis of the exclusionary rule centered on the nature of the object sought to be seized.
See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (private nature of papers seized was
key to suppression of their use). In Weeks, however, the Court transferred the emphasis from
the nature of the object seized to the validity of the procedures utilized. 232 U.S. at 346.
In 1927, the Court further widened the scope of the exclusionary rule in Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), by reversing a conviction which had been based on evidence
illegally seized by state police with the assistance of federal officers. Twenty-two years later,
in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), the Court, clarifying Byars, concluded that
evidence could be utilized if "secured by state authorities [and] turned over to the federal
authorities on a silver platter" as long as the federal government did not participate in the
violation of the citizen's privacy rights and the government did not request the illegal search.
Id. at 78-79. For a discussion of Lustig and Byars, see notes 30-31 and accompanying text
supra.
On the same day that Lustig was decided, the Supreme Court, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949), held the fourth amendment protections of privacy applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, but declined to require the states to apply the exclusion-
ary rule because that rule was a product of "judicial implication" in federal cases and not
expressly conferred by the fourth amendment. Id. at 28. The Court, noting that many states
were reluctant to adopt the exclusionary rule even after Weeks, elected to defer to the judg-
ment of the states as to protecting individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id. at 28-31.
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eral searches.34 Thus, evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment during the course of a state search could be admitted
at trial in state court, even though federal agents had been involved
in the search." By fashioning the Byars-Lustig doctrine, and catego-
rizing as a federal warrant that which otherwise would have been
labeled as a state warrant, the Supreme Court may have been at-
tempting to enlarge the class of individuals protected by the exclu-
sionary rule.3 6 Once a warrant was found to be federal in nature by
virtue of federal participation in the search, the defendant became
eligible to invoke the exclusionary rule.3 1
Subsequent to the emergence of the Byars-Lustig approach,
In 1960, in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the Court rejected the "silver
platter doctrine" enunciated in Lustig, and held that federal courts were no longer permitted
to receive evidence unconstitutionally seized by state officials. Recently, however, in United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Supreme Court approved what has been termed by
one commentator as a "good faith, intersovereign, cross-action exchange of [illegally seized]
evidence" between state law enforcement agents and the Internal Revenue Service for use in
a civil tax proceeding. Note, Recasting the Silver Platter: United States v. Janis-Another
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 489, 489 (1977). See also Comment,
The United States v. Janis-The Return of the "Silver Platter Doctrine," 12 N.E. L. REV.
789 (1977); see generally Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule
and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621; Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule: Past, Present, No Future, 12 AM. CraM. L. REV. 507 (1975); Comment, The Exclusionary
Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its Development and Application, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 64
(1961); Comment, Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence-The Federal Exclusionary
Rule-A Historical Analysis, 38 U. DEr. L.J. 635 (1961).
3 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 396-98 (1914).
11 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), wherein the Supreme Court held that "in a
prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid
the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure," id. at 32, and
thus left the decision whether to adopt the Weeks exclusionary standards to the states. Id.
at 33. At the time of the Wolf decision in 1949, 31 states had rejected the federal Weeks
standards while only 16 states embraced it. See Table I of Appendix, reprinted in 338 U.S.
at 38.
" The language of Byars clearly indicates that the Court was cognizant of the abuses
which might occur if a federal agent could participate in a state-oriented search unhampered
by fourth amendment constraints:
[Tihe court must be vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to detect
and a hand to prevent violation of the Constitution by circuitous and indirect
methods. Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property are to
be liberally construed, and "it is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitu-
tional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."
273 U.S. at 32 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
It is significant that in both Byars and Lustig the level of participation by federal agents
in the respective searches was minimal. Yet in both cases the Supreme Court found a federal
search and was therefore able to exclude the challenged evidence. 338 U.S. at 77-80, 273 U.S.
at 30-34. Moreover, the Lustig opinion seems to indicate that federal participation, no matter
how limited, would be sufficient to support a finding that the warrant was federal in nature.
338 U.S. at 78.
3 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1926).
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however, the Supreme Court, in Mapp v. Ohio,3" held that the exclu-
sionary rule governs state as well as federal searches.39 In the wake
of Mapp, the Byars-Lustig rule no longer is necessary to safeguard
the rights of its original beneficiaries. As a result, it is submitted,
the rationale for strict application of the rule has been effectively
undermined. Perhaps it would be appropriate, therefore, for the
Second Circuit to reevaluate its adherence to the Byars-Lustig doc-
trine. An alternative to that doctrine would entail an evaluation, on
a case-by-case basis, of the relative extent to which federal and state
agents have participated in a joint search and a corresponding cate-
gorization of the warrant.
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the vitality of its
rationale, the Byars-Lustig rule is overwhelmingly accepted by ex-
isting judicial authority."0 Thus, the warrant at issue in Turner must
be deemed federal in nature. Moreover, since the violation that had
occurred had been a technical one, the court properly determined
that, under the Burke test, no prejudice to the defendant had re-
sulted.4 As technical defects are not the type of evil which the
exclusionary rule is designed to deter, absent unfairness, they may
be disregarded. 2
The Second Circuit's approval of the telephone-authorized
search warrant in Turner is consistent with recently enacted rule
41(c). Designed to minimize existing technical obstacles, the new
rule delineates procedures for obtaining oral authorization of search
warrants. 3 Although the provisions of this statute were not in effect
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 657. In Mapp, three Ohio police officers had broken into Mapp's home claiming
that they had a search warrant. Id. at 644. At defendant's trial for possession of obscene
matter, the prosecution failed to produce the warrant. Id. at 645. In a landmark opinion
written by Justice Clark, the Court held the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 657.
The decision in Mapp has provoked considerable controversy. Compare Traynor, Mapp
v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319 and Comment, Judicial Integrity
and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129 (1973) with Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U.L.
REy. 1 (1964) and Note, The Privacy Interest of the Fourth Amendment-Does Mapp v.
Ohio Protect It or Pillage It?, 74 W. VA. L. REV. 154 (1971).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 469 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1972); Navarro v. United
States, 400 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1968).
41 517 F.2d at 386.
11 Id. at 386-87.
10 Rule 41(c)(2) provides: "When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in the
absence of a written affidavit, a search warrant may be issued upon sworn oral testimony
. . . communicated . . . by telephone or other appropriate means. . . ." FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(c)(2). Under the procedures, a duplicate original warrant is prepared by the applicant and
read for the magistrate's recordation and signature. Upon the magistrate's satisfaction that
1978]
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when the Turner warrant was issued," the Second Circuit clearly
applied similar standards in evaluating the procedures used by the
issuing magistrate in that case. Thus, the Turner decision suggests
that, in the future, the Second Circuit will uphold the constitution-
ality of the new rule 41(c) procedures in the absence of a showing
that their flexible norms have been abused.
It has been suggested that a rule permitting oral authorization
of search warrants will reduce the need for judicially created excep-
tions45 to the constitutional prohibition of warrantless searches.46
Such exceptions have been developed in the past to permit law
enforcement officials to bypass the somewhat time-consuming pro-
cedures for obtaining a warrant when delay might result in the
destruction or removal of important evidence.47 Although these ex-
ceptions were necessary to meet immediate and reasonable law en-
forcement needs, they appear somewhat anachronistic in an age of
all the requirements for issuance of the warrant have been met, he can direct the applicant
to sign the magistrate's name and the exact time of issuance of the duplicate original warrant.
Id. at 41(c)(2)(A). The amended rule further requires the recording of the conversation either
by device or manual methods. Id. at 41(c)(2). This further restriction on the use of the oral
warrant procedures recognizes two inherent limitations in their use: the lack of demeanor
evidence and the possibility that highly complex warrants might be issued without the benefit
of a written record. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976); Comment, Oral Search Warrants: A New
Standard of Warrant Availability, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 691, 701-05 (1973).
While only California and Arizona have thus far authorized oral search warrant applica-
tions, Amiz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1444(c), 13-1445(c) (Supp. 1973); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1526b,
1528b (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1978), the remaining states have been encouraged to follow suit.
"It is recommended that every State enact legislation that provides for the issuance of search
warrants pursuant to telephoned petitions and affidavits from police officers." NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE 95 (1973).
See, e.g., Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches and Seizures: The Michigan Proposals,
73 MICH. L. REV. 221 (1974); Nakell, Proposed Revisions of North Carolina's Search and
Seizure Law, 52 N.C. L. REV. 227 (1973).
" The amendment became effective on October 1, 1977. Pua. L. No. 95-78, § 4(b), 91
Stat. 322 (1977).
11 See NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON RULES, FED. R. CrIM. P. 41, 3 U.S.C. app. R.
41, at 436.
11 In Katz v. United States, 383 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court stated that
"[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or mag-
istrate, are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment-subject only to a few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions." Id. at 357 (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
11 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); United States v. Pino, 431 F.2d
1043 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969) (approving search incident to lawful arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967) (permitting search of escape route during hot pursuit of suspect); see generally Mas-
colo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth
Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 419 (1973).
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electronic communication. 8 It is submitted that the Second Cir-
cuit's acceptance of the telephone-authorized Turner warrant, cou-
pled with its implicit approval of rule 41(c), will have a salutary
effect in that it will encourage law enforcement officials to seek
prior judicial approval for searches. It should be noted, however,
that the widespread use of telephonic search warrants also raises the
possibility that these flexible procedures will be abused by overzeal-
ous law enforcement personnel or careless magistrates. It is hoped
that, in the future, the Second Circuit will be alert to this possibility
and will scrutinize oral warrant-issuing procedures carefully to in-
sure that adequate procedural and substantive standards of law are
being observed.
Dennis Glazer
A recent survey conducted in California determined that 65% of all telephonic search
warrants take 1 hour or less from decision to seek a warrant until time of issuance, with a
majority of the remaining 35% completed in less than 2 hours. Miller, Telephonic Search
Warrants: The San Diego Experience, 9 THE PROSECUTOR 385, 386 (1974).
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